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NONPROFIT PAYMENTS TO INSIDERS AND

OUTSIDERS: IS THE SKY THE LIMIT?
Jill S. Manny*
INTRODUCTION

A quick peek at The Chronicle of Philanthropysalary survey indicates
that salaries of nonprofit organization executives have increased
dramatically over the past decade.' Newspaper coverage of this topic
suggests that some of2 these salary increases have not been well considered
or properly approved.
Over the past few decades, the law has struggled, somewhat
unsuccessfully, to control these salary increases. In the summer of 1996,
Congress enacted legislation as part of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights II in an
attempt to curtail excessive payments to nonprofit executives. 3 The4
legislation, which was codified as § 4958 of the Internal Revenue Code,
imposes penalty excise taxes as a sanction on public charities and social
5
welfare organizations that engage in "excess benefit transactions."
* Professor Jill S. Manny, New York University School of Law; Executive Director,
National Center on Philanthropy and the Law. Thanks to Roger Colinvaux and Linda Sugin
for making me write this essay, to Elizabeth Boris for her comments, and to Aric Hansen,
Alex Roberts, and Elisabeth Lemer for their invaluable research assistance. Thanks also to
Professor Stephen Schwarz for his insightful comments and to Marion Fremont-Smith for
providing us with so many wonderful resources that it makes writing much easier and more
tempting. And thanks to Professor Harvey Dale for his many years of guidance and
friendship.
1. See Noelle Barton et al., Top Nonprofit Executives See Healthy Pay Raises, Chron.
of Philanthropy, Sept. 28, 2006, at 39; Noelle Barton & Peter Panepento, Executive Pay
Rises 4.6%, Chron. of Philanthropy, Sept. 20, 2007, at 34.
2. See Michael W. Peregrine & Robert C. Louthian, American University: Significant
Implicationsfor Nonprofits, 50 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 337 (2005); Beth Healy et al., Charity
Money Funding Perks, Boston Globe, Nov. 9, 2003, at Al; Beth Healy et al., Some Officers
of Charities Steer Assets to Selves, Boston Globe, Oct. 9, 2003, at Al; Michael Rezendes,
AG's CharitiesChief to Review Salariesat 2 Foundations,Boston Globe, Dec. 23, 2003, at
Al.
3. Pub. L. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1475 (1996) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4958
(2000)). The Treasury issued proposed Regulations under this provision in the summer of
1998, issued temporary Regulations in January 2001, and issued final Regulations in January
2002. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958 (2006).
4. All section references, unless otherwise indicated, refer to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended, or to the Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder.
5. I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1). The statute defines "excess benefit transaction" as "any
transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-exempt
organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person if the value of
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These rules are not meant to penalize public charities. Rather, they are
viewed positively, as an intermediate sanction which allows the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) to discipline a charitable organization without
revoking its tax-exempt status if the organization crosses over into an
inurement situation 6 but still generally operates for the benefit of the public.
The statute and regulations also are favorable to charities because they
dictate a procedure that charities can follow in order to avoid wasting
charitable assets while compensating executives. They create a safe harbor
process for organizations to follow in setting certain salaries, 7 under the
theory that organizations that follow this process are more apt to set
reasonable, or at least market rate, salaries than organizations that set
salaries outside the process. 8 Ultimately, the intermediate sanctions
provisions are all about process, not substance.
There is evidence, however, that § 4958 and its process have not been
effective in reducing or even maintaining salary levels in the nonprofit
sector. In fact, since 1996, salaries paid to organizational insiders have
skyrocketed. 9 There is some indication that stratospheric compensatory
payments made by public charities are not limited to payments made to
"disqualified persons." 10 Several cases, as well as newspaper articles,

the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration (including the
performance of services) received for providing such benefit." Id. § 4958(c)(1)(A).
6. Loosely translated, the inurement proscription is generally considered to prohibit the
flow of assets of a charity away from the charity for non-charitable purposes to someone
with substantial influence over the charity. See supra Part I|.A. The intermediate sanctions
imposed under § 4598 are not intended to extend the definition of "inurement." See Harvey
P. Dale, The Crux of Charity: Inurement, Private Benefit, and Excess Benefit Transactions
(Oct. 28, 2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law), available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/library/publications/Conf2004_DaleDRAFT.pdf.
Professor
Dale's article contains an excellent discussion of the inurement concept and of the history of
the enactment of I.R.C. § 4958.
7. Section 4958 only covers payments by public charities to executives with
"substantial influence over the affairs" of the organization. The organizational insiders are
referred to as "disqualified persons." I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(a); see
also I.R.C. § 4958(c), (f)(l); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(a).
8. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
9, Pablo Eisenberg, Skyrocketing CEO Pay Raises Questionsfor Charities, Chron. of
Philanthropy, Feb. 8, 2007, at 37; Elizabeth Schwinn & Ian Wilhelm, Nonprofit CEOs See
SalariesRise, Chron. of Philanthropy, Oct. 2, 2003, at 27.
Compensation for the leaders of the nation's largest nonprofit organizations
rose at more than twice the rate of inflation last year ....
The chief executives at the nation's biggest charities and foundations received a
median pay increase of 4.6 percent in 2006, a year in which the inflation rate was 2
percent.
The results reflect a decade-long trend in which compensation growth for
executives of large nonprofit groups outpaced inflation.
Barton & Panepento, supra note 1, at 34.
10. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(a). In the statute and the Treasury
Regulation, "disqualified persons" are defined generally as those with "substantial influence
over the affairs of the organization." I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(a); see
also United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1175-76 (7th Cir. 1999).
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highlight substantial compensatory payments made to persons and entities
without "substantial influence" who provide services to public charities.1 1
A review of the annual disclosure returns filed by various hospitals and
universities reflects high salaries paid to physicians, football coaches, and
money managers, often topping the amounts paid to the hospital's or the
university's chief executive. 12 In many instances, these payments are
subject to neither the process nor the sanctions imposed under 13§ 4958
because the recipients of the payments are not disqualified persons.
This essay examines whether § 4958 or a similar regime should be
applied to private benefit transactions that do not involve insiders or
disqualified persons. Part I of the essay presents a discussion of current
standards of "reasonableness" in both the for-profit and the nonprofit
sectors. Part II of the essay examines the current regime of restrictions and
sanctions in the nonprofit sector that seeks to limit salaries to "reasonable"
amounts. It examines excess benefit transactions, as well as the interrelated
concepts of private inurement and private benefit, from both a policy and a
technical perspective, in order to determine whether any of the available
restrictions and sanctions are effective in limiting what many consider to be
excessive salaries.
Part III of the essay examines the problem of increasing salaries of noninsiders in the nonprofit sector. Part IV discusses the policy considerations
behind the enactment of § 4958 and argues that while § 4958 is effective as
to process, it does not succeed in limiting or reining in executive salaries in
the nonprofit sector. The purpose of § 4958 is not to rein in executive
salaries, but rather, its purpose is to ensure that executive salaries in the
nonprofit sector reflect market rates. For these purposes, a "reasonable"
salary is a salary that reflects the market for similar positions in the same or
similar locations. Organizations that follow the process clearly are more
likely to set market rate salaries than those that ignore the process. For this
and other reasons, § 4958 or some similar process and sanctions should be
compelled in private benefit, non-inurement situations where the
compensated individual does not have substantial influence over the affairs
of the organization. Part V addresses the advisability of applying § 4958 in
non-inurement private benefit situations. Part V concludes by suggesting
some alternative mechanisms and modifications to current law that, if
implemented, may deter payments of excessive compensation both to
insiders and to outsiders.
I. STANDARDS OF REASONABLENESS

The concept of reasonableness "defies simple interpretation by tax
experts in the same manner that the hypothetical reasonable man escapes
11. Barton & Panepento, supra note 1, at 34; Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Finds Errors in
Reports of Nonprofits, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2007, at A15.
12. Barton & Panepento, supra note 1, at 34
13. I.R.C. § 4958(a), (c), (f)(1); Treas. Reg. § 4958-3.
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precise definition by negligence lawyers and the concept of reasonable
doubt remains an elusive factor in the criminal law."' 14 Thus, it seems
impossible to formulate an objective standard of reasonableness to
moderate executive salaries in either the for-profit or the nonprofit sector.
The IRS and the courts are left with a subjective facts and circumstances
test to measure reasonableness.
A. For-ProfitStandardsand Penalties
In enacting § 4958 in 1996, Congress indicated that relevant nonprofit
sector salaries should be set using comparables and that those comparables
could include salaries paid by similarly situated for-profit entities as well as
nonprofit organizations.' 5 It makes sense, therefore, to first examine briefly
the policy, standards, process, and penalties used to set for-profit
compensation.
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code allows for-profit entities a tax
deduction for a "reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation
for personal services actually rendered."' 16 According to the Treasury
Regulations accompanying § 162, the "test of deductibility in the case of
compensation payments is whether they are reasonable and are in fact
payments purely for services."' 17 The Regulations further provide that
"reasonable and true compensation is only such amount as would ordinarily
be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances" on
"the date when the contract for services was made, not those existing at the
date when the contract is questioned." 18
This language clearly anticipates a facts and circumstances test, which,
by definition, establishes a subjective and nonmeasurable standard for
reasonableness of compensation in the for-profit sector. Its focus on market
comparables suggests that any market rate salary will qualify as reasonable.
The goal, then, of the "reasonableness" restriction under § 162 is to achieve
salaries at market rates. Code § 4958's reliance on § 162 standards
suggests a similar market rate target in the charity realm.
Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Treasury Regulations specify
an objective test for determining reasonable compensation. In the for-profit
realm, the IRS and the courts generally have sought to identify various facts
and circumstances that might help them to arrive at an estimate of
reasonableness in a particular situation. The determination of what
constitutes reasonable compensation is "a question of fact, to be determined
14. Gerald A. Kafka, Reasonable Compensation, 390-3d Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA), at
A-3 (2001).
15. Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 104th Cong., General Explanation of Tax Legislation

Enacted

in

the

104th

Congress

57-58

(Comm.

Print

1996),

available

at

http://www.house.gov/jct/s-12-96.pdf, see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2).

16. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(a).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3).

Similar language is repeated in the Treasury

Regulations accompanying I.R.C. § 4958. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii).
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by the peculiar facts and circumstances in each particular case." 19 There is
no single determinative factor and the IRS does not issue letter rulings or
technical advice on the issue of whether the "compensation is reasonable in
amount." '20 Without precedential IRS rulings or statutory guidance, the
determination of reasonable compensation is, as the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit concluded in Kennedy v. Commissioner,2 1 "more
22
nearly an art than a science."

Although no codified or regulatory method exists for determining the
reasonableness of compensation, the IRS and the courts loosely apply a

multifactor test. When determining the reasonableness of a salary, "[t]he
situation must be considered as a whole, with no single factor being
The Internal Revenue Manual lists eight factors for
decisive." 23
The courts have
determining the reasonableness of compensation. 24
focused on various several groups of factors, but there is no single
definitive list.
The U.S. Tax Court and appellate courts have built several multifactor

tests in an attempt to standardize the criteria used for making these
determinations. The Sixth Circuit developed a list of nine factors in
Mayson Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner.2 5 Another court divided the
factors into five broad categories that essentially cover every aspect of the
compensation arrangement 26 and other courts have devised similar facts and
28
circumstances tests, 27 many with factors that overlap the Mayson test.

However, none of these tests is sufficiently objective to create a measurable

or objective standard of reasonableness. 29 It appears then, that we are left

19. Miller Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 149 F.2d 421, 423 (4th Cir. 1945) (citing H. Levine &
Bros. v. Comm'r, 101 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1939)).
20. Rev. Proc. 2005-3, § 3.01(16), 2005-1 C.B. 118, 119.
21. 671 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1982).
22. Id. at 173.
23. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Salina v. Comm'r, 528 F.2d 176, 179 (10th Cir. 1975).
24. See IRS, Internal Revenue Manual: Audit Techniques for Business Returns (May 5,
2006), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch33s02.html#d0e460533.
25. 178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949) ("Such factors include the employee's
qualifications; the nature, extent and scope of the employee's work; the size and
complexities of the business; a comparison of salaries paid with the gross income and the net
income; the prevailing general economic conditions; comparison of salaries with
distributions to stockholders; the prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions
in comparable concerns; the salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees; and in the case
of small corporations with a limited number of officers the amount of compensation paid to
the particular employee in previous years.").
26. Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm'r, 716 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing factors
including (1) role in company, (2) external comparison, (3) character and condition of the
company, (4) conflict of interest, and (5) internal consistency).
27. See, e.g., Rutter v. Comm'r, 853 F.2d 1267, 1271 (5th Cir. 1988); Pepsi-Cola
Bottling, 528 F.2d at 179; Trucks, Inc. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 638, 642-43 (D. Neb.
1984).
28. Still other courts have used an independent investor standard. See Elliotts, 716 F. 2d
at 1245.
29. The existing § 162 standard of reasonableness has been interpreted to make it
malleable to the individual circumstances of the case. This is reflected in the variety of
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with a standard of comparables and market rates. Tying reasonableness to
market comparables, however, assumes that the comparables are
reasonable, which may not be the case. If inflated comparables can be
found and utilized, inflated compensatory arrangements may result. If this
process is repeated, the inflated compensatory arrangements become market
rate, and salaries continue to soar. But it is significant to keep in mind that,
to the extent that a particular salary is comparable to salaries for similar
positions (i.e., 30reflects market rates), it should qualify as reasonable for
these purposes.
Process in the for-profit sector authorizes boards of directors of for-profit
corporations to set compensation and, in the absence of waste or
malfeasance, the decisions of boards generally are upheld under the
"business judgment rule." 3 1 Corporate fiduciaries are held to a duty of care
and a duty of loyalty. The business judgment rule shields directors from
liability for decisions made in the ordinary course of business. When selfdealing is charged in a for-profit context, courts are more likely than not to
sustain executive compensation where the interested executive made a full
disclosure of the plan, the plan was approved by either a committee of
disinterested directors or shareholders, and the plan was fair to the
corporation. 32 In these instances, the court generally will use the business
judgment rule to determine if the directors have complied with the duties of
33
loyalty and care.
Courts can challenge the compensation set by boards in the for-profit
sector, but such challenges are rare. Courts generally are unwilling to
factors that different courts consider in determining whether or not compensation may be
defined as reasonable for the purposes of § 162. While different courts have added and
subtracted a great variety of factors, there is no "definitive list." Eberl's Claim Serv., Inc. v.
Comm'r, 249 F.3d 994, 999 (10th Cir. 2001) (illustrating the lack of a definitive list by
documenting the different number of factors used by five other courts).
30. This is not intended to provide a complete discussion of the standards of
reasonableness under § 162. For a detailed discussion of that issue, see Michael Q. Eagan,
Note, Reasonable Compensation and the Close Corporation: McCandless, the Automatic
Dividend Rule, and the Dual Level Test, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 441 (1974).
31. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 667-72 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (illustrating that courts
are reluctant to interfere and that the business judgment rule applies to executive
compensation decisions), affd, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1941); see also Harvey J.
Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes,
Problems, and ProposedReforms, 23 J. Corp. L. 631 (1998).
32. According to the American Law Institute,
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills his duty
[of care] if:
(1) he is not interested in the subject of his business judgment;
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business judgment to
the extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances; and
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best interests
of the corporation.
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 4.01(c) (Tentative
Draft No. 11, 1991) (citation omitted).
33. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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intervene in decisions made by boards of directors and therefore tend not to
second-guess boards' compensation plans. For example, in Heller v.
Boylan, the court felt that it was "ill-equipped to solve or even to grapple
with [this] entangled economic problem[]. ' '34 The court stated that
shareholders are best able to determine "what is reasonable compensation
for [the corporation's] officers." 35 In an unusual case, the U.S. Supreme
Court did challenge a compensation arrangement and found that the
compensation plan in question violated the corporate waste doctrine even
though it had been ratified by the company's shareholders. 36 Courts rarely
deem compensation schemes unreasonable because of the dearth of
guidelines available to determine whether compensation is sufficiently
excessive to result in corporate waste. The absence of any objective
standard of reasonableness and the wide range of comparables available in
the market give directors significant leeway and protection in setting
executive compensation in the for-profit arena.
The sanctions for excessive salaries in the for-profit sector are distinct
from those available in the nonprofit sector. Aside from the potential loss
of a tax deduction under § 162 at the corporate level, shareholder derivative
suits and shareholder proxy actions with respect to elections of directors or
changes in bylaws may be utilized to keep for-profit salaries in check.
None of these sanctions would be particularly relevant in the nonprofit
sector because it is a non-shareholder realm.
B. Nonprofit Standards and Sanctions
In enacting § 4958 in 1996, Congress made clear that, for purposes of the
new statute, the standards of reasonableness set forth in § 162 of the
37
Internal Revenue Code and its accompanying regulations would apply.
Like the for-profit sector, reasonableness in the nonprofit sector is based on
Charities are permitted to pay reasonable
market comparables.
compensation for services rendered. Reasonable salaries are defined as "the
amount that would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises
(whether taxable or tax-exempt) under like circumstances .... Section 162

standards apply in determining reasonableness of compensation, taking into
to a person and the rate at
account the aggregate benefits . ..provided
38

which any deferred compensation accrues."
As mentioned above, reasonableness is determined more by process than
through objective criteria. 39 The final Treasury Regulations promulgated
under § 4958 create a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness that sets
34. Heller, 29 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
35. Id.

36. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933).

37. H.R. Rep. No. 104-506, at 56 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1124, 1179
("Existing tax-law standards (see sec. 162) apply in determining reasonableness of
compensation and fair market value.").
38. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii) (2006).
39. See supra Introduction.
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forth a process to be followed in setting salaries. 4 0 Following the process
creates a safe harbor for the cooperative organization, which shifts the
burden of proof of reasonableness to the IRS. 4 1 Once the burden shifts, the
IRS will be required to present "sufficient contrary evidence to rebut the
probative value of the evidence put forth by the parties to the transaction" in
42
order to prove an excess benefit transaction.
The process for establishing a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness
under § 4958 is threefold. First, compensation decisions must be approved
by a board or committee of the board composed entirely of individuals who
do not have a conflict of interest with respect to the compensation
arrangement being considered. 43 Second, the authorizing body must
properly base its decision on comparables, as discussed below. 44 And third,
the authorizing body must properly document the basis for its
determination. 45 These procedures are not required, and an organization
failing to follow this process will not automatically be subject to sanctions
as a result of such failure, but adhering to this process will provide the
organization with a safe harbor by giving rise to the aforementioned
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness that shifts the burden of proof of
reasonableness to the Service. 46 The policy behind the grant of this
presumption must be that it is more likely that organizations following the
procedure to produce this presumption will set salaries at market rates than
those that do not adhere to the procedure. There is some merit to this
47
suggestion.
The Treasury Regulations promulgated under § 4958 attempt to define
the types of data necessary to prove reasonableness of compensation,
including (1) "compensation levels paid by similarly situated organizations,
both taxable and tax-exempt, for functionally comparable positions"; (2)
"the availability of similar services in the geographic area of the applicable
tax-exempt organization"; (3) "current compensation surveys compiled by
independent firms"; and (4) "actual written offers from similar institutions
competing for the services of the disqualified person." 48 Data that satisfies
these requirements will fulfill the second prong of the process for securing
the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.

40. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6.
41. See id.
42. H.R. Rep. No. 104-506, at 56 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1124, 1179;
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c).
43. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c).
44. Id.
45. Id.

46. See id. § 53.4958-6(e). Note that these procedures do not apply to setting
compensation for non-disqualified persons. The process also does not apply to individuals
hired under initial contracts. See id. § 53.4958-3(a).
47. A.L. (Lorry) Spitzer, Executive Compensation in Nonprofit Health Care
Organizations: Who's in Charge?, 15 Health Matrix 67, 73 (2005).
48. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i).
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The process for setting compensation, while helpful in that it requires
attention to and affirmative action in salary setting, does nothing to
establish an objective standard of reasonableness. Nor would it make sense
for the IRS to police the actual salaries paid by hundreds of thousands of
public charities. The compensation arrangements arrived at through the
process are likely to be, more or less, reflective of market rates for similar
services in the nonprofit and for-profit sectors in the same or similar
geographic location. But as those market rates rise, compensation may
exceed what the public would perceive as reasonable. In effect, if an
organization sets a salary based on another salary or collection of salaries
that is excessive, the second salary may be deemed "reasonable" for
purposes of establishing a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness,
although it may in fact, by many standards, not be reasonable at all. Again,
inflated comparables are likely to protect an organization but still give rise
to inflated compensatory arrangements. In a short period of time, the
process can lead those inflated compensation arrangements to set the market
rate standard.
Although the standards in the charitable sector mirror the standards in the
for-profit sector, the sanctions do not. Sanctions in the nonprofit sector are
primarily government imposed, namely, intermediate sanctions under §
4958 and the ultimate sanction of loss of exemption available under §
501(c)(3). 4 9 Arguably, the public can sanction a charity for excessively
compensating its executives through withholding of charitable contributions
and refusal to purchase the charity's goods and services, but this public
impact requires disclosure and transparency that currently are difficult to
50
detect in the nonprofit realm.
C. The End Result
In sum, measuring reasonableness for purposes of § 4958 by reference to
the reasonableness standards used to measure compensation in the for-profit
sector gives rise to several inevitable flaws in outcome. First, the standard
articulated under § 162 does not delineate a particularly concise and
measurable standard of reasonableness. It is difficult, perhaps impossible,
to detennine with any certainty what the limits of reasonableness are with
respect to the salary for any particular executive position in a for-profit
corporation or a nonprofit organization. Second, although the process and
sanctions for establishing reasonableness in the for-profit sector may appear
to be more robust than the process and sanctions available to charities, the
standards are equally subjective and the resulting salaries in the for-profit
sector may be even more inflated. 51 Third, the sin of exorbitant salaries in
the charitable sector seems somehow greater because of the availability of

49. See infra Part 1I.B-C.
50. See infra Part V.C.7.
51. Gretchen Morgenson, Outside Advice on Boss's Pay May Not Be So Independent,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2006, at Al.
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the charitable contribution deduction. 52
In other words, funding
extravagant salaries with deductible contributions from the public is more
offensive than funding enormous salaries with for-profit corporate earnings.
And fourth, in any sector, determining compensation through comparables
that may be excessive because of the absence of an objective standard of
reasonableness is likely to result in compensation arrangements that meet
market standards but not the public perception of reasonableness. Perhaps
the lack of precision in determining reasonableness of salaries is not sector
specific. In other words, setting and measuring reasonable salaries may
simply be impossible. The best that we can hope for and achieve is salaries
that comply with market rates. That seems to have been the goal of
Congress in enacting § 4958 of the Internal Revenue Code.
II. THE CURRENT REGIME

Compensatory payments made by charities 53 are subject to a three-part
regulatory regime. Three interrelated concepts-inurement, private benefit,
and excess benefit transactions 54-create a regime that aims to limit
executive salaries paid by charities to "reasonable" amounts. All of these
concepts police the same boundary aimed at ensuring that charities operate
55
for public, rather than private, benefit.
A. PrivateInurement
The inurement concept derives from the language of the Internal Revenue
Code, which states in § 501(c)(3), that an organization will qualify for
exemption under that provision only if "no part of [its] net earnings...
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. '56 This
restriction applies to all organizations exempt under § 501(c)(3).
The inurement proscription is drafted somewhat incomprehensibly.
Although it is not specifically defined in the Internal Revenue Code or the
Treasury Regulations, the doctrine of private inurement is generally
considered to prevent income and assets of a tax-exempt organization from
flowing away from the organization to one or more persons with control
over the organization for nonexempt, non-charitable purposes. The essence

52. I.R.C. § 170 (2000).
53. Such payments refer to all organizations exempt under § 501(a) and described in §
501 (c)(3), comprising both public charities and private foundations.
54. A similar, albeit more wide-reaching set of restrictions, is applied in the private
foundation universe to prohibit transactions between private foundations and disqualified
persons with respect to those foundations. I.R.C. § 4941.
55. For an excellent discussion of the history of these three concepts, see Dale, supra
note 6, at 11-32.
56. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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of the concept is to ensure that an exempt organization subject
to this
57
provision will serve a public interest rather than a private interest.
The private inurement doctrine represents the substantive dividing line
between nonprofits and for-profits because it mandates the nondistributional constraint. For the most part, the characteristics of nonprofits
and for-profits are identical-both entities must be created in some legal
form (e.g., trust, fund, corporation), pay compensation to employees, incur
similar expenses, may make investments, are able to receive a profit, and
produce and sell goods or provide services.5 8 But, a nonprofit, unlike a forprofit, cannot distribute its profits to those who control it, other than as
reasonable compensation.5 9 This restraint is intended to insure that the
assets of a tax-exempt organization inure to public, rather than private,
benefit. The non-distribution
restraint is the primary distinction between
60
nonprofits and for-profits.
Under § 501(c)(3), the private inurement proscription is an absolute
proscription, the violation of which should cause an organization to fail the
operational test and to lose its tax-exempt status. In other words, the
proscription has a hair trigger-one dollar of inurement is enough. There is
no de minimis exception to the inurement prohibition. 6'
Because
revocation of exemption seemed like a rather severe penalty, and perhaps
because it had the effect of penalizing a charity and its beneficiaries rather
than the perpetrator in certain cases, the penalty often was not imposed, at
least in cases of minor inurement. 62 This means that no sanction was
imposed at all, even though some public money went to serve a private
purpose.
B. Private Benefit
A concept that is similar to and overlaps at some points with the private
inurement proscription is the private benefit limitation. The two concepts
are distinct and separate requirements for exemption. 6 3 The private benefit
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (2006); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov.
22, 1991). See generally John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 Fla. L. Rev.
1063 (2006).
58. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 585
(1997); James J. Fishman & Stephen Schwarz, Cases and Materials:
Nonprofit
Organizations 476 (3d ed. 2006); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation
Law, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 501-04 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit
CorporationLaw]; Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,89 Yale L.J. 835,

838 (1980).
59. Subcomm. on Oversight of H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., Report on
Reforms to Improve the Tax Rules Governing Public Charities 14-15 (1994).
60. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit CorporationLaw, supra note 58, at 501-02.

61. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
62. United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1999);
Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1068 (1989); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
63. Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. at 1068; see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-506, at 53 n.2
(1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1124, 1176 n.2.
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restrictions apply to insiders as well as to third parties, and prohibit
anything more than the receipt of incidental private benefits by a person.
Unlike private inurement, then, the test for private benefit is both qualitative
and quantitative-private benefit must be both qualitatively and
quantitatively incidental. 64 Also unlike private inurement, private benefit is
not subject to a hair trigger.
The private benefit proscription is not found in the Internal Revenue
Code; it is expressed only through the regulations, case law, and IRS
rulings. It derives, perhaps loosely, from § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) of the
Treasury Regulations, which provides that an organization will not qualify
for exemption under § 501(c)(3) "unless it serves a public rather than
private interest. '65 Thus, "it is necessary for an organization to establish
that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as
designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the
or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private
organization,
66
interests."
The doctrine of private benefit then differs from private inurement in
three significant respects. First, the private benefit proscription applies to
payments to insiders as well .as to payments to "disinterested persons" while
the inurement proscription applies only to payments to organizational
insiders. 67 Second, private benefit will only result in a sanction if it is
qualitatively and quantitatively more than incidental, while private
inurement is not subject to a de minimis threshold. 68 And third, the only
available sanction for private benefit is the ultimate sanction of loss of
exemption, while the most likely sanction for most forms of private
inurement in a public charity is an excise tax under § 4958. As stated by
Professor Harvey Dale, "[T]he inurement rules require the finding of an
'insider' and are then trigger happy; the private benefit rules apply to any
recipient of a private benefit but require a balancing of benefits to the public
'69
against the benefits to the recipient.
C. Excess Benefit Transactions
The third concept in the border patrol regime safeguarding charitable
assets from private interests is the proscription against "excess benefit

64. As the U.S. Tax Court concluded in American CampaignAcademy, "[N]onincidental

benefits conferred on disinterested persons may serve private interests." 92 T.C. at 1069.
See also United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1999).
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (2006).

66. Id.
67. See Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. 1053; Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 58, at
485-86.
68. I.R.S. Announcement 92-83, 1992-22 I.R.B. 59; I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862
(Nov. 22, 1991).
69. Dale, supra note 6, at 14; see also Colombo, supra note 57, at 1067-69.
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transactions" imposed by § 4958. This provision is a relative newcomer to
the regime, having been enacted in 1996.70
Section 4958 imposes penalty excise taxes as an intermediate sanction on
on § 501(c)(4) organizations that engage in
§ 501(c)(3) public charities and
"excess benefit transaction[s]. ' ' 7 1 "Excess benefit transaction" is defined in
§ 4958(c)(1) as "any transaction in which an economic benefit is
provided.., directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified
person" if "the value of the economic benefit provided [to the disqualified
person] exceeds the value of the consideration (including performance of
services) received by the organization for providing such benefit. ' 72 This
(a) excess
definition refers primarily to two kinds of transactions:
compensation paid to a disqualified person by a public charity or social
welfare organization and (b) transactions between a disqualified person and
loan, sale, royalty
a public charity or social welfare organization (e.g., lease,
73
person.
disqualified
the
favor
unduly
that
arrangement)
III. THE PROBLEM
Many charities pay substantial salaries to persons who do not fall within
the definition of disqualified persons for purposes of § 4958. Even if those
salaries are excessive, no sanctions are likely to be imposed. For example,
it has been reported that, for the fiscal year ending in 2006, New York
University (NYU) President John Sexton was not the most highly paid
employee at NYU. 74 That honor went to James Grifo, M.D., a professor of
obstetrics and gynecology at the university's medical school, who earned
$2,823,406 for the same period. 75 In fact, the five most highly paid
individuals at the university all are on the NYU School of Medicine faculty,
all have the same office address as Dr. Grifo, and all earned in excess of
$2,000,000 for that period. 76 More significantly for the purposes of this
essay, while President Sexton is undoubtedly an insider for purposes of the
inurement proscription 77 and a disqualified person for purposes of the
excess benefit transaction provisions, Dr. Grifo and his colleagues arguably
70. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1311(a), 110 Stat. 1452, 1475-79
(1996) (codified at I.R.C. § 4958 (2000)).
71. Dale, supra note 6, at 29-30.
72. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1). Note that § 4958(c)(4) extends the definition to include certain
revenue sharing transactions, where the benefit provided to the disqualified person is

determined in whole or in part by the revenues of one or more activities of the organization,
but only to the extent provided in the Treasury Regulations. As no such Regulations have
been promulgated to date and it is unlikely that the Treasury will promulgate Regulations on
this point in the near future, this essay will not focus on this portion of the definition of
"excess benefit transaction." The Pension Protection Act of 2006 also expanded the
definition of "excess benefit transaction" by adding § 4958(c)(2)-(3) to the Internal Revenue
Code. These provisions are not discussed in this essay.
73. See I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(1)-(2) (2006).

74.
75.
76.
77.

Cf Barton & Panepento, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
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do not wield substantial influence over the affairs of the university or even
over a "discrete segment or activity of the organization that represents a
substantial portion of the activities, assets, income, or expenses of the
organization, as compared to the organization as a whole," 78 and therefore
may not be subject to the inurement proscription or the excess benefit
transaction sanctions. 79 If these salaries are excessive, the only penalty
available is loss of exemption for the university under the private benefit
doctrine. It is unlikely that the penalty will be imposed unless the
university in question no longer seems to be operated primarily for its
exempt public purposes. Accordingly, no sanction is likely to be imposed
in this situation even if some assets of the university may flow to the private
benefit of university employees for nonexempt purposes.
Similarly, much ink has been spilled in the press regarding the salaries of
the Harvard Management Company (HMC) money management gurus led
by Jack Meyer, who recently left Harvard to form his own fund largely
because of the publicity. 80 The salaries of certain HMC employees
exceeded $35 million in 2003, while Mr. Meyer himself earned a mere $6.9
million that year for managing an endowment in excess of $19.3 billion
dollars. 8 1 While Mr. Meyer arguably was a disqualified person subject to §
4958, many of the other highly compensated money managers undoubtedly
did not have substantial influence over the affairs of Harvard or the HMC.
Accordingly, they were not subject to § 4958's compensation-setting
process or sanctions. If comparables had been applied to determine the
reasonableness of their salaries, the outcome of the reasonableness test
would hinge largely on whether or not the comparables were derived from
the for-profit or the nonprofit sector. During the same time period,
University of Texas money manager Bob L. Boldt received $743,316 for
managing the second-largest university endowment, while David F.
Swenson received $1,027,685 for managing the third-largest university
endowment at Yale University.8 2 If comparables are to be drawn from
other similarly situated universities in the nonprofit sector, the salaries of
Mr. Meyer and his colleagues may appear excessive.8 3 But if salaries of
for-profit money managers are added to the compensatory pool, the HMC
78. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e)(2)(v).

79. Even if it could be argued that Dr. James Grifo is a disqualified person as director of
New York University's fertility program, it would be hard to argue that the four physicians
who work with him wield similar influence.
80. See generally Riva D. Atlas & Stephanie Strom, Doesn't Anyone Want to Manage
Harvard'sMoney?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2005, at C1.
81. Charles Stein, Harvard's $12 Billion Man: Despite Outpacing His Peers, the
Strong-Willed Endowment Chief Is Under Attack for Paying Millions to His Money
Managers, Boston Globe, Oct. 17, 2004, at Dl; Stephanie Strom, Harvard Money
Managers'PayCriticized,N.Y. Times, Jun. 4, 2004, at A18.

82. See Strom, supra note 81.
83. See id. It would be important to take performance into account in that analysis.
Harvard Management Corporation's managers produced a total return of 12.5% after fees
and expenses, David F. Swenson's return at Yale was 8.8%, while the University of Texas
saw a 12.8% return but earned on a smaller pool of funds. Id.
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salaries will pale in comparison. 8 4 In any event, given the negative press
and the outcry from the public and Harvard alumni, it seems that while the
salaries of Mr. Meyer and his money managers are "reasonable" based on
the market-based approach dictated by § 4958 and the Treasury
Regulations, they do not comport with public perceptions of reasonable
salaries. It also seems likely that even if the salaries of the money managers
are inflated when compared to market comparables, Harvard will not lose
its exempt status and no penalties will be imposed.
The problem posed by the examples described above is that the salaries
flowing to Dr. Grifo and his colleagues and to the HMC money managers,
particularly if they do not wield substantial control over the affairs of the
universities or a discrete segment of the universities that employ them, are
not likely to be excessive when measured under the standards of § 4958, §
162, or any other imaginable standard. The precise reason for this is that
these highly compensated employees do not have the control to force their
employers to pay them unreasonable amounts. It may be unfair to penalize
someone who negotiates a lucrative arrangement in good faith and at arm's
length just for getting a good deal. To the extent that § 4958 is about
process, the arm's-length arrangement should sanitize the negotiation and
result in market rate salaries without forcing the § 4958 process on the
negotiations. In other words, with respect to non-insiders, perhaps the
market should police the process, making the additional statutory procedure
unnecessary. Ultimately, though, the market might not adequately perform
this function.
It is worthwhile to consider the extent of the problem. In fact, although
evidence is slim, the evidence that does exist suggests that most
compensation paid in the nonprofit sector is not excessive. As Elizabeth
Boris of the Urban Institute points out, "The factual basis for asserting that
there is widespread excessive compensation in the nonprofit sector is
weak-but the perception is undoubtedly true." 85 A recent IRS report
similarly concludes that "[e]xaminations completed to date do not evidence
widespread concerns [about executive compensation] other than
reporting." 86 But both the statistics put forth by Boris and the IRS report
confirm that the problem is not nonexistent and that where excess
compensation is paid by nonprofits the numbers may be high. In other
words, public funds are being expended for non-charitable purposes. If
these payments can be curtailed without too much cost in terms of time or

84. Stein, supra note 81; Strom, supra note 81.
85. Elizabeth T. Boris, Address at Nat'l Tax Ass'n's 36th Annual Spring Symposium
and State-Local Tax Program I (May 18, 2006) (transcript on file with author) (commenting
on an earlier draft of this essay).
86. IRS, Report on Exempt Organizations Executive Compensation Compliance
Project-Parts I and II, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/exec._comp._final.pdf. The report also states that since "this was not a statistical
sample, no definitive statement can yet be made concerning the compliance level in this
area." Id.
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money to the charities, it is a worthwhile pursuit, even if the problem is
small.
The ultimate question is, Should the § 4958 regime be imposed in noninurement private benefit situations? Before reaching a conclusion on that
question, it is worthwhile to examine some of the policy questions
surrounding the enactment of § 4958.
IV. POLICIES SURROUNDING THE ENACTMENT OF § 4958
Before contemplating an expansion of the application of § 4958 to noninurement private benefit situations, it is prudent to examine Congress's
impetus for its enactment of the intermediate sanctions regime. Three
significant points are worth noting: First, the intermediate sanctions were
endorsed by the IRS to provide additional but less draconian sanctions for
violations of the inurement proscription. Second, the intermediate sanctions
regime imposed by § 4958 was propelled largely by efforts of the nonprofit
sector on which it was to be imposed. 87 And third, the point of the
legislation was to enforce the standard of reasonable compensation through
a process meant to produce market rate salaries for certain employees of
charities. 88 There is no evidence that the legislation was intended to rein in
or limit salaries other than to market rates.
When § 4958 was enacted in 1996, it was intended to provide an
intermediate sanction, short of the ultimate sanction of loss of exemption,
when the inurement proscription was violated but where the organization
nevertheless seemed to be operating primarily for the exempt purposes for
which it was formed. The inurement proscription is breached only in
situations involving a charity and someone with substantial control over the
charity or a segment of the charity (i.e., an insider or disqualified person). 89
The legislative history behind § 4958 quite clearly indicates that the
provision is not intended to expand the reach of the inurement
proscription.9" The application of § 4958 in non-inurement private benefit
situations would greatly expand the reach of the inurement proscription.
The primary reason for enacting the intermediate sanctions under § 4958
was not to penalize charities. 9 1 Rather, the availability of the intermediate
sanction was intended to benefit charities in that it provided a penalty short
of the ultimate penalty for charitable organizations that engaged in some,
perhaps de minimis, amount of inurement. 92 As discussed earlier, the
inurement proscription does not require a minimum amount of inurement in
order to elicit the ultimate sanction. 93 One dollar of inurement technically
87. For an excellent discussion and analysis of the legislative history supporting these
conclusions, see Dale, supra note 6, at 21-22.
88. See Spitzer, supra note 47.
89. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
90. H.R. Rep. No. 104-506, at 56 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1124, 1179.
91. See Dale, supra note 6, at 19.

92. Id.
93. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
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violates the language of § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.94
Inurement, therefore, is subject to a hair trigger, so that indisputably
charitable organizations could, in theory if not in practice, suffer the
ultimate sanction for a de minimis instance of inurement.
Prior to the enactment of § 4958 in 1996, the only sanction available for
excessive payments to insiders in a public charity was revocation of
exemption. 9 5 The policy behind the enactment of the § 4958 intermediate
sanctions seems to be that if an organization is not operating primarily for
charitable purposes it should not be exempt as a charity, whether because of
too much inurement to insiders or because of too much private benefit to
third parties. In that case, the exemption should be revoked. But in some
instances the overly generous organization continues to operate primarily
for charitable purposes in spite of some private inurement flowing to
someone with substantial influence over the organization. In these cases,
the disqualified person should be punished (along with those entrusted with
protecting the assets of the organization), rather than the entire organization
and all of its donors and potential beneficiaries. 96 But § 501(c)(3), if read
literally, has a hair trigger-any inurement will cost the organization its
exemption. This is what § 4958 is meant to address-it protects otherwise
97
charitable organizations from this hair trigger.
The hair trigger in the inurement proscription has caused considerable
enforcement issues for the IRS. In testimony at a congressional hearing in
1993, then-Commissioner of Internal Revenue Margaret Richardson said, in
part,
The lack of a sanction short of revocation of exemption in cases in
which an organization violates the inurement standard or one of the other
standards for exemption causes the Service significant enforcement
difficulties. Revocation of an exemption is a severe sanction that may be
greatly disproportional to the violation in issue. For example, assume that
an examination of a large university reveals that the university is
providing its president with inappropriate benefits. The university may be
paying the president a salary that appears excessive in comparison to that

94. See id.

95. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
96. In situations involving inurement, excess benefit transactions, and self-dealing, the

person receiving excessive payments from the charity is, by definition, an "insider" or
"disqualified person" with respect to the charity. In other words, the inurement, excess
benefit, and self-dealing regimes apply only to those with a special relationship to the charity
that is likely to yield substantial influence over the organization to the overpaid individual.
In the private benefit situation, sanctions may be applied to a charity for excessive payments
to those without substantial influence over the charity making the payment, but the private
benefit must be both qualitatively and quantitatively substantial, and the sanction is imposed
on the organization and not on the overpaid individual. As a result, sanctions generally are
not imposed in isolated instances of excessive salary or other compensation paid to nondisqualified persons as long as the charity is deemed primarily to be operated for charitable,
exempt public purposes in spite of these instances of private benefit.
97. See supra Part II.C for a more detailed discussion of excess benefit transactions and
§ 4958.
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Alternatively, the
paid to presidents of comparable universities.
university may have provided the president with a substantial interest-free
loan. It may have paid for costly and luxurious amenities in the
president's official residence. Each of these facts would raise serious
inurement questions. Revoking the university's exemption, however, may
be an inappropriate penalty. Revocation could adversely affect the entire
university community-employees, students, and area residents.
Moreover, even if the organization's exemption were revoked, the
president would be able to retain the benefits inappropriately received
from the university. In short, the Service may be faced with the difficult
choice of revoking an organization's exemption or taking no enforcement
has been reported
action as long as the compensation in question
98
accurately on the individual's income tax return.
The problem is clear. As Professor Dale comments, "Revocation would
punish the innocent, disrupting many important relationships and
expectations. It would have little or no impact on the recipient of the
inurement." 99 This problem, which the intermediate sanctions regime
sought to resolve, is caused by the hair trigger. The lack of a hair trigger in
the private benefit situation makes the policy for applying the intermediate
sanctions in non-inurement private benefit situations less vivid.
V. SHOULD § 4958 APPLY TO PRIVATE BENEFIT SITUATIONS?
A. Policy Considerations
For several reasons, requiring the process and imposing the penalties of §
4958 to compensatory arrangements involving non-disqualified persons
seems wrong. First, as discussed above, if the regime does not effectively
moderate salaries paid to those subject to its reach, why extend its reach? If
the goal is to regulate salaries paid by charities and evidence is that the
result will not reflect that goal, an extension of § 4958 to a much wider
range of employees will simply increase the charity's administrative costs.
In other words, the salaries will not decrease, and the costs of paying a
salary consultant will reduce the funds that a charity has available to spend
on programs. The result is a loss of funds for public purposes, a result not
to be encouraged.
Second, it is difficult to justify penalizing someone without substantial
influence over the affairs of a charity for negotiating a lucrative
arrangement in good faith and at arm's length. If excessive compensation is
the result of such negotiations, it is fallacious to assign blame to the skillful
negotiator. If any fault is to be found, it should be with those responsible

98. Federal Tax Laws Applicable to the Activities of Tax-Exempt Charitable
Organizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 103d Cong. 18-19 (1993) (prepared statement of Hon. Margaret Milner Richardson,

Comm'r of Internal Revenue).
99. Dale, supra note 6, at 19.
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for negotiating and approving the contract on behalf of the charity. As
Judge Richard Posner pointed out in United Cancer Council v.
Commissioner, "[The outside fund-raiser] did not, by reason of being able
to drive a hard bargain, become an insider of UCC."' 0 0 In other words, an
excessive salary negotiated in good faith and at arm's length by a noninsider might not be a good deal for the charity, but it is not inurement. The
directors may have violated state corporate fiduciary duties of care. If this
is the case, the penalty should be borne by the directors and imposed under
state not-for-profit
corporate law. Imposing
sanctions on the
overcompensated and the organization places the penalty on the skilled and
the innocent rather than on the careless.
A third rationale dictating against the expansion of § 4958 to noninurement private benefit transactions is more practical. If true standards of
reasonableness do not exist either in the for-profit or the nonprofit realm, it
becomes impossible to identify a salary that is unreasonable. In other
words, in the absence of an ascertainable standard, delineating between
reasonable and unreasonable payments is unfeasible except in extreme
circumstances. 10 1 Unless a viable method for determining what constitutes
an excess benefit transaction can be formulated, applying a set of rules that
lacks an ascertainable standard to a new set of service providers will not
meet the objective of moderating the amounts paid to the new group.
On the other hand, a strong policy does exist for policing salaries in pure
private benefit situations. The fundamental tenet of the charitable sector is
to ensure that the assets held by charities are used exclusively for public,
charitable purposes rather than for private purposes. The goal of avoiding
diversions of charitable assets for private purposes by prohibiting waste in
the form of excessive compensation is paramount to the proper functioning
of the nonprofit sector. After all, private benefit to non-insiders is and
should be prohibited.
To permit charitable assets to flow away from a
charity for nonexempt purposes would be to violate the non-distribution
constraint and to eradicate the fundamental distinction between the charity
and General Motors. The argument would follow that, while § 4958 has not
proved an effective tool in reducing or even stabilizing salaries, it is useful
in directing charities to set salaries using a more rigorous process. 102
Perhaps, then, in spite of policies to the contrary, this policy should win out
in an attempt to preserve charitable assets for charitable purposes.
B. Applying the § 4958 Process to Payments
to Non-disqualifiedPersons
Section 4958 could be expanded to cover compensatory payments to
some non-disqualified persons through a new regime crafted to apply only

100. United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1178 (7th Cir. 1999).

101. For an example of an extreme circumstance where an excess benefit transaction was
readily identifiable, see Caracci v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 379 (2002).
102. See Spitzer, supra note 47, at 82.
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to these non-inurement situations. It would be more efficient, however, to
apply the current § 4958 regime to these situations because the regime is
already in place and both charities and regulators are, slowly but surely,
becoming familiar with the process that it compels. It would be wise to
modify the process required by § 4958 for setting salaries for highly
compensated non-disqualified persons because the policies for the
extension of § 4958 to non-insider transactions is different and the lower
policy threshold might not justify as formidable of a financial or
administrative burden.
The first necessary modification to the current § 4958 standards would
require expanding the definition of disqualified persons under § 4958 to
include some portion of the persons most highly compensated by the
charity, perhaps including some independent contractors. For example, a
new category of disqualified person could include the top ten percent of all
persons compensated by the charity, including both currently defined
disqualified persons and a new group of non-influential but highly
03
compensated disqualified persons. 1
Second, because the lower policy threshold for subjecting non-inurement
payments to § 4958's process and sanctions does not justify the same
financial and administrative burden required for excess benefit transactions
as currently defined, a modified and less cumbersome process should be
implemented for the new set of transactions. The "do it yourself' process
available to small organizations 10 4 could be modified to suit this purpose. It
might suffice, for example, for a public charity using the § 4958 process to
set a salary for a non-influential disqualified person to examine
comparability data from perhaps five similarly situated organizations in the
same location for similar positions. Required comparability data would be
easily obtainable from GuideStar and other Internet sources without charge
and with minimal effort. This "do it yourself' process would reduce the
cost of compliance with § 4958, both in terms of dollars and time, in noninurement private benefit compensation situations where the likelihood of
salaries exceeding market rates is lower than in the traditional excess
benefit transaction situation.
C. Strengthening the ProcessDictated by § 4958
One of the arguments against applying a § 4958-like regime to
compensation arrangements for non-disqualified persons is that § 4958 has
done little to maintain or rein in salaries for disqualified persons. 10 5 If the
extension of § 4958 to a much wider range of employees will simply

103. The new category would contain provisions similar to Treas. Reg. § 53.49583(e)(3)(ii) (2006) to exclude attorneys, accountants, and investment advisors, where

appropriate.
104. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(ii). Thanks to Professor Stephen Schwarz for coining
that phrase.
105. See supra Part V.A.
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increase the charity's administrative costs and do nothing to regulate
salaries, perhaps such an extension cannot be justified. But if § 4958 is
ineffective in stemming the rising salaries in the nonprofit sector, perhaps it
could be modified to make it more effective in protecting charitable
06
assets. 1
1. Alter the Process
One possible solution for the problem of escalating salaries in the public
charity sector would be to alter the process for setting salaries to one which
might produce less inflated salaries. This change in process might include
eliminating for-profit salaries from the list of permitted comparables for
setting nonprofit salaries, setting a higher standard, including requiring a
greater number of more closely linked comparables for setting salaries for
disqualified persons, and imposing more stringent sanctions for failure to
comply with the new and more stringent process. 10 7 It might also include
mandating a required percentage of independent directors on a board for an
organization wishing to take advantage of the process. 108
The change in process might also eliminate the safe harbor aspect of the
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness and make the procedure dictated
by § 4958 a threshold for avoiding penalties under that provision. If, as
seems clear, the best that § 4958 can offer is process, not substantive
limitations on salaries, imposing that process on charities is sensible. The
process merely compels charities to do what they should be doing anyway
as "best practices." Following the requirements of the process will force
the board to determine comparable market rates and to make some effort to
reflect those rates in setting salaries. Operating under the assumption that
nonprofit managers want to set salaries that do not exceed market rates,
106. Similar suggestions have been discussed elsewhere. See Marion R. Fremont-Smith,
Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law and Regulation (2004)
[hereinafter Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations]; Panel on the Nonprofit
Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance, and Accountability of Charitable
Organizations: A Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector (2005) [hereinafter
at
Panel,
Final
Report],
available
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel-Final-Report.pdf; Panel on the Nonprofit Sector,
Strengthening Transparency, Governance, Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A
Supplement to the Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector (2006), available at
Marion
R.
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/supplement/Panel-Supplement-Final.pdf.;
Fremont-Smith, The Search for GreaterAccountability of Nonprofit Organizations: Recent
Legal Developments and Proposalsfor Change, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 609 (2007).
107. If it proves to be more competent in restraining rising salaries in the private
foundation universe than § 4958 is in the public charity arena, it might make sense to import
the § 4941 self-dealing regime to public charities as a replacement for § 4958, although the
author is somewhat skeptical of imposing that more stringent regime on public charities at
this point, particularly in light of the lack of data indicating that it is, in fact, more effective
in setting market rate salaries. For an interesting discussion on this topic, see Marion R.
Fremont-Smith, Is It Time to Treat Private Foundations and Public Charities Alike?, 52
Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 257 (2006).
108. See Charles M. Elson, Executive Compensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C.
L. Rev. 937, 942-43 (1993).
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requiring these managers to consider and document comparable market
rates would help them to achieve the goal of setting fair salaries. The
downside to this suggestion, in many cases, is the expense of paying a
salary consultant to provide the required data. Ultimately, one would hope
that this data would become more readily available at reduced or no cost.
In any event, excessive salaries inevitably cost the sector more than the cost
of obtaining data. The conversion of the safe harbor into a threshold
requirement should be accompanied by an expansion of the organizations
and the positions for which a less costly "do it yourself' process could be
implemented.
2. Increase Responsibility of and Sanctions on Salary Setters
Another avenue to pursue in the quest for "reasonable" salaries is the role
and responsibility of salary setters.
Increasing both the fiduciary
responsibilities and the penalties for directors and trustees could be a step
toward restraining salaries to levels perceived as reasonable. 10 9 After all,
salaries do not set themselves.
The current "knowing," "willful"
standard110 permits extensive escape routes for those charged with setting
and reviewing salaries. It seems to penalize directors and officers only if
they willfully approve a transaction knowing that the transaction violates
the law. Harvard Hauser Center scholar Marion Fremont-Smith quite
correctly calls this a "serious flaw" in the excise tax provisions.' 1 '
Combined with the limits on liability for the sanctions imposed under §
4958 and the shifting of the burden of proof to the IRS to prove knowing
participation, 112 these escape routes logically result in a less active role for
directors and trustees than one might hope for. As Harvey Goldschmid
points out, "[T]he roles of directors of nonprofit institutions are more
demanding and complex than those of their for-profit peers, but almost all
evidence suggests that nonprofit directors provide less oversight, less
effective participation in decision-making, and in general, less effective
governance than their peers in comparable for-profit corporations."1 3 The
increase in penalties on organization managers enacted in the Pension
Protection Act of 2006114 was a step in the right direction, but more steps
are needed to bring the law to its proper destination.

109. This suggestion was included in the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector's report
Strengthening Transparency, Governance, and Accountability of CharitableOrganizations:

A Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector. Panel, Final Report, supra note 106, at

88-89.
110. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(d)(3)-(6).
111. Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 106, at 261.
112. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(d)(7)-(9).
113. Goldschmid, supra note 31, at 632; see also Michael Klausner & Jonathan Small,
Failing to Govern? The Disconnect Between Theory and Reality in Nonprofit Boards and
How to Fix It, Stan. Soc. Innovation Rev., Spring 2005, at 42.
114. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of the
I.R.C.).
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Increasing the pressure on managers to properly set salaries by providing
fewer escape hatches and increasing penalties could result in more input
from directors and trustees based on their own notions of reasonableness.
To the extent that the boards of charities are composed to reflect the
community in which the charity operates, these notions of reasonableness
should conform to and reflect that community's notion of reasonableness.
Although this change in standards and penalties would do nothing to
elucidate the meaning of "reasonableness" in the charitable arena, the
additional pressure on managers might, as a practical matter, rein in
excessive salaries based on excessive comparables.
The argument against increasing the responsibilities and potential
liability of directors who generally serve charities without compensation is
that this added pressure and the consequences of failure to act might deter
some candidates from serving as charitable fiduciaries. Eliminating escape
routes and increasing penalties would inevitably dissuade inattentive
directors from joining nonprofit boards.
Deterring individuals not
interested in exercising their duty of care and loyalty to the organization,
however, should be viewed as a positive result of higher standards and
increased sanctions for directors and trustees. As a society, we should not
encourage inattentiveness among individuals selected to safeguard public
funds by not requiring those individuals to pay attention.
3. Increased Scrutiny and Enforcement
Another possible solution to the problem of escalating compensation in
the nonprofit sector is increased federal and state enforcement of the
preservation of charitable assets for public purposes and the expansion of
the pool of persons eligible to enforce. As Fremont-Smith elucidated in her
testimony before Congress, "It is not the Code provisions that are
inadequate; rather it has been the inability of the Service to adequately
police the sector."' 1 5 Specifically, if state attorneys general and the IRS
were to increase scrutiny and enforcement over the use of assets by
charities, or if others were anointed through grants of standing to perform
this role, nonprofits would be less likely to waste charitable assets in the
form of excessive compensation. This scrutiny and enforcement should be
coupled with an improved Form 990.116
Sadly, although an improved Form 990 is in the works, increased
scrutiny, at least at the federal level, will require additional funding for the
exempt organizations function at the IRS, and additional funding is not
115. Letter from Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Senior Research Fellow, Hauser Ctr. for
Nonprofit Orgs., Harvard Univ., to Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin., &
Max Baucus, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Fin. 1-2 (July 13, 2004) (on file with author);
see also Stephanie Strom, New Equationfor Charities: More Money, Less Oversight, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 17, 2003, at Fl; J. Christine Harris, Grassley: GAO Report on 9/11 Charities
Shows Needfor Oversight, 38 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 17 (2002).
116. See Peter Swords, The Form 990 as an Accountability Tool for 501 (c) (3) Nonprofits,
51 Tax Law.571 (1998).
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likely to be forthcoming. Accordingly, while increased state and federal
enforcement inevitably would have an impact on salaries paid in the nonprofit
sector, insufficient funding and human power suggest that is not a viable
solution to the problem at this juncture.
State enforcement of fiduciary duties of officers and directors, particularly
with respect to salary setting, is lax and demands significant attention and
augmentation. Under state law, there is a perception that there are more
significant issues for attorneys general to police."17 Furthermore, since
attorneys general often are elected, suing the directors of a charity is not
always politically expedient. Also, state charities officials suffer from lack of
information because the IRS is limited in the amount of information that it
can share with state officials."l 8 Finally, attorneys general offices, like the
IRS, generally are understaffed in the charities area. 119 In rare cases where
attorneys general do take action, the focus seems to be on issues of fundraising and charitable solicitation rather than on breaches of board fiduciary
duties.
In sum, federal and state oversight of charities with respect to the nondistribution constraint is lax and inadequate. In order to maximize the impact
of insufficient resources and attention, a unified standard and compliance
regime should be set as a regulatory goal. Accordingly, the states should be
encouraged to enact legislation which parallels the provisions of § 4958.
Setting a single standard for charity compliance will both reduce costs of
20
compliance and increase familiarity and compliance with those standards. 1
4. Expanding Standing to Sue Charities
Generally, under common law, the attorney general has exclusive
standing to sue to enforce charitable purposes. 12' The policy for this
exclusive authority is somewhat obvious-it is intended to avoid frivolous
lawsuits that would cause charities to waste charitable assets to defend

117. See Harvey P. Dale, Tax-Exempt Organizations: The Winds of Change, Norman A.
Sugarman Memorial Lecture at Case Western Reserve University 4 (Mar. 20, 1991),
available at http://archive.nyu.edu/bitstream/2451/23385/2/HPD.TEO.CaseWest.9 1.pdf; see

also Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 106, at 443.
118. Increasing the flow of information from the Internal Revenue Service to the state
attorneys general would certainly aid in the enforcement lapses. The Pension Protection Act
of 2006 took a step in the right direction, but further legislative action will be required to
permit much needed information sharing. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified in
scattered sections of the I.R.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
119. See Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the CharitableSector, 28 U.S.F. L.

Rev. 37, 41 (1993)
120. See generally Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Interim Report Presented to the Senate
Finance
Committee
(2005),
available
at
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/interim/PanelReport.pdf.
121. Blasko et al., supra note 119, at 40-41; see also Evelyn Brody, Whose Public?
Parochialismand Paternalismin State CharityLaw Enforcement, 79 Ind. L.J. 937 (2004).
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themselves. 122 However, since attorneys general frequently fail to enforce
state laws against charities for reasons discussed above, 12 3 and since few
others generally have standing to sue, 124 enforcement tends to be lax. There
is an argument to be made, therefore, that expanding the number of parties
with standing to sue charities to enforce charitable purposes would cut
down on diversions of charitable assets for non-charitable purposes,
including excessive compensation. The policy against permitting frivolous
law suits, however, should trump the claims for expanding standing to sue
charities. In the wrong hands, this right is simply too dangerous and might
cause charities to expend more charitable assets defending baseless lawsuits
than society would preserve through a few meaningful legal challenges to
excessive compensation.
5. Capping Revenue Based Compensation
Capping revenue based compensation is another mechanism that would
encourage a reduction in compensation paid by charities to insiders and
outsiders. In the absence of regulations specifically addressing revenue
based compensation, mandating a fixed amount cap might be sensible, but it
is not required except in the case of discretionary ("non-fixed") payments
poised to take advantage of the rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness.1 25 A cap is not required to take advantage of the rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness or the initial contract exception with regard
to fixed payments, but the regulations do say that a cap is "a relevant factor
in determining the reasonableness of compensation." 126 On the other hand,
with respect to discretionary payments, a cap will convert the payment into
a fixed payment at the capped amount, at least for purposes of the rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness, 12 7 so the cap is particularly relevant in that
situation.
The result in the fixed payment situation where no cap is required is
problematic in an attempt to restrict compensatory payments made by
charities. Reasonableness of compensation to be paid under a revenue122. Ronald Chester, Improving Enforcement Mechanisms in the CharitableSector: Can
Increased Disclosure of Information Be Utilized Effectively?, 40 New Eng. L. Rev. 447
(2006); see also Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 106.
123. See supra Part V.C.2.
124. For excellent discussions of standing to sue charities, see Rob Atkinson, Unsettled
Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of CharitableFiduciaries?,23 J. Corp. L.
655 (1998); Harvey P. Dale, Standing to Challenge Tax-Exempt Status, 307 PLI/Tax 491
(1990); see also Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 106, at
448-49.
125. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(d)(2) (2006).
126. Id. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(A).
Note that revenue based compensation that is
nondiscretionary is considered "fixed" for purposes of that provision.
127. The Regulations do not specifically provide that capping a discretionary payment
will convert it into a fixed payment for purposes of the initial contract exception, but if the
payment does not qualify for the initial contract exception because it is not fixed, it should
flow into the general rules where capping it will protect it under the rebuttable presumption
of reasonableness. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(d)(2); id. § 53.4958-4(a)(3).
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sharing arrangement can be determined at the time of entering into the
contract. If the amount likely to be paid at that time (based on a proper
calculation and projected valuation) is reasonable, it is likely that there will
not be an excess benefit transaction later when the amount payable under
the agreement is actually paid, even if the recipient ends up with a windfall
based on revenues actually generated. If the mandated process is followed
and the payment qualifies as "reasonable," the payment will be protected by
the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, and should not constitute an
excess benefit when paid.' 28 Actually requiring a cap on revenue based
compensation will protect organizations from paying out a windfall to
anyone subject to § 4958 or any similar regime. Even in situations where
the disqualified person can only benefit proportionately to the benefit
bestowed on the organization by the disqualified person, a cap on revenue
based compensation will result in more funds for the charity.
6. Capping Salaries
Another potential avenue of resolution for the problem of escalating
payments in the nonprofit sector is a cap on overall salaries (or perhaps only
on compensation paid to disqualified persons, as that term may be
redefined) expressed as a percentage of gross annual revenue or through
some other objective measurement. For example, salaries for a public
charity for any year might be capped at fifteen percent of the organization's
"normal" gross revenues. The sanction for failure to comply with this
requirement might be loss of exemption under § 501(c)(3). Alternatively,
the sanction might be correction plus an excise tax on managers, perhaps
with no escape routes. The benefits to this solution are threefold: First, it
puts more pressure to bear on managers to set reasonable salaries. Second,
compensation paid by a charity will bear a relationship to the size of the
charity. And third, it gives the charity a choice as to how it spends its
capped amount. It could choose to hire fewer highly compensated
employees or more employees who are paid less. The charity could
determine which method is the most efficient for its purposes. The negative
result is that charities may lose out to for-profit entities (or even to larger
charities) in hiring the best candidates. Congress was clearly aware of this
negative when it enacted § 4958, as reflected in the legislative history to
9
that provision.'

2

7. Disclosure
A final solution to the problem of escalating payments in the nonprofit
sector to insiders and non-insiders is increased transparency through

128. It is the projected amount that must be reasonable based on comparables, not the
formula used to determine the amount.
129. H.R. Rep. No. 104-506, at 56-60 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1124,
1179-83.
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increased disclosure. "Sunshine" has always been the most effective
deterrent for both malfeasance and nonfeasance in this realm.' 30 Disclosure
more similar to that required for private foundations could be required for
public charities. This might increase public policing of charities, since the
31
IRS and the states seem to be short staffed.1
Disclosure and transparency should be increased to permit more public
oversight of public charities. Congress concluded in the 1960s that the
stringent regulation applied to private foundations was not necessary in the
public charity universe because public charities were more publicly
accountable. 132 Public charities rely on the public for donations and for
purchases of goods and services. If a public charity runs amok, the public
will cease to support it. In effect, the marketplace monitors public charities.
No similar public controls can be imposed on private foundations because
private foundations are not dependent on the public. In other words, while
the public bears some of the burden for policing public charities, the
government must police private charities in a more rigorous manner.
Accordingly, increased disclosure for public charities would enhance the
tools that the public could utilize to more effectively fulfill its oversight role
in the charitable sector.
With increased transparency marketplace
supervision will become informed supervision.
Ultimately, in order to increase transparency, disclosure should be
targeted to those most likely to impact the bottom line of the charitydonors. Although much of the relevant salary information is available to
donors on GuideStar and directly from the charities, it is unlikely that many
potential donors seek out the information prior to making a contribution,
particularly when the contribution is destined for an established charity
such as a university, museum, or hospital. This forced transparency could
be implemented simply by adding a provision to § 170(f)(8) that would
require that the contemporaneous written acknowledgement delivered to
donors must include a copy of the donee organization's Form 990, parts VA and V-B, 133 or better yet, must include a list of total amounts paid to all
disqualified persons in the prior taxable year of the organization, as the term
"disqualified person" would be expanded to include the new category of
non-influential but highly compensated persons.1 34 This will almost surely
have an impact on escalating compensatory payments in the nonprofit
sector.

130. Chester, supra note 122; see also Goldschmid, supra note 31.
131. See Dale, supra note 117, at 4; see also Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit
Organizations, supra note 106, at 443-448.
132. Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 PrivateFoundationLaw: HistoricalPerspective on its
Origins and Underpinnings,27 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 52 (2000).
133. This portion of the Form 990 reveals compensation paid to current and former
officers, directors, trustees, and key employees.
134. This suggestion will not be popular with charities because of its potential impact on
charitable giving, but it is worth considering in light of the impact it would have on
compensation in the nonprofit sector.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is clear that § 4958 is helpful to public charities in that it
provides a lesser sanction for charities that engage in an inurement
transaction but otherwise operate primarily for charitable purposes.
Furthermore, it penalizes the proper culprits. The statute and regulations
are all about process, not substance. They create a safe harbor process for
organizations to follow in setting salaries for disqualified persons under the
theory that organizations that follow this process are more likely to set
reasonable salaries. It seems probable that organizations that follow this
process are more likely to set salaries at market rates. Section 4958,
however, has done nothing to limit the escalation in compensation paid to
disqualified persons in public charities. In effect, if an organization sets a
salary based on another salary or collection of salaries that is excessive, the
second salary arguably will reflect market rates and be deemed
"reasonable" for purposes of establishing a rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness, although it may in fact, by many standards, not be at all
reasonable.
Again, inflated comparables are likely to protect an
organization (or at least to shift the burden of proof to the IRS) but still give
rise to inflated compensation arrangements.
It is clear from legislative history, though, that § 4958 was not intended
to rein in, reduce, or even stabilize salaries paid to nonprofit executives. It
was intended only to ensure that these salaries reflect market rate
compensation for similar positions. Although the process can be abused,
charitable fiduciaries determined to set fair salaries are more likely to
accomplish this goal using the process compelled by § 4958.
In spite of excellent reasons not to extend § 4958 to non-inurement
private benefit transactions, if excessive salaries are being paid to noninsiders, those salaries should be subject to regulation and penalties in order
to avoid wasting charitable assets. Under current law, insubstantial
excessive payments to non-disqualified persons will not result in either the
ultimate or an intermediate sanction. Accordingly, charitable funds will be
used for non-charitable, private purposes without repercussion. Creating
repercussions might be accomplished through a new regime to apply only to
non-inurement private benefit transactions, but it would be much more
efficient to apply § 4958 in these situations because the regime is already in
place and both charities and regulators are familiar with the process that it
compels. It would be essential to modify the process required by § 4958 for
setting salaries for highly compensated non-insiders, because the policies
for the extension of § 4958 to non-insider transactions are different.
In order to expand the reach of § 4958 to non-insider arrangements, the
definition of disqualified persons should be modified to include some
portion (perhaps ten percent) of the persons most highly compensated by
the charity, including currently defined disqualified persons and certain
independent contractors. A modified process similar to the "do it yourself'
process available to small organizations should be available for determining
comparables for the new category of non-influential but highly
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compensated disqualified persons. Perhaps in a situation where the board is
setting the salary of a non-disqualified person, the board could satisfy the
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness using self-obtained data from five
similarly situated organizations for similar positions. That would eliminate
concerns of wasting charitable assets to pay salary consultants in the pure
private benefit, non-inurement situation where abuse is likely to occur.
In order to make the recommended expansion of § 4958 to noninfluential highly paid service providers more meaningful, § 4958 must be
made more robust and effective in all of its applications. To accomplish
this goal, the standards and penalties for managers should be increased.
The penalty increases enacted in the Pension Protection Act of 2006135 may
be sufficient to deter lackadaisical salary setting by boards if the standards
that apply to board members are made more stringent (i.e., if escape hatches
were reduced). In addition, the process compelled by § 4958 should be
declared as a threshold for avoiding penalties under § 4958 rather than as an
optional method of securing protection. Requiring caps on revenue based
compensation should be considered, as should capping the overall amount
of salary paid to disqualified persons (using the modified definition of that
term).
Finally, an increase in disclosure and transparency should be mandated.
This can best be accomplished by adding a provision to § 170(f)(8) that
would require that the requisite contemporaneous written approval must
include a copy of the organization's Form 990, part V, or better yet, a list of
total amounts paid to all disqualified persons in the prior taxable year of the
organization (as the term "disqualified person" would be defined as
suggested above). In other words, supply the marketplace with tools to
enhance the efficacy of its supervision. In combination with the suggested
changes to process, this increase in transparency would inevitably affect
escalating compensatory payments to insiders and non-insiders in the
nonprofit sector. Until these steps are taken, the sky may be the only
effective limitation on compensation paid by charities.

135. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of the
I.R.C. and 29 U.S.C.).

Notes & Observations

